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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

MARYLAND
Kirby v. Hook, 701 A.2d 397 (Md. 1997) (holding that use of water
through an underground pipeline was adverse for purposes of establishing a prescriptive easement, and that a party could tack the time of
a predecessor's adverse use to their own to satisfy the required time
period).
The water source at issue was a spring located on a parcel of land
that was once part of a single 3.42 acre parcel. The land was divided
into three parcels and sold to different owners. The Kirbys purchased
the spring parcel. The Hooks purchased parcel "B," the parcel that
was non-appurtenant to the Kirby's spring parcel. The previous owners of parcel B received oral consent from the Kirbys to install an underground water line running from the spring to parcel B. After the
pipeline was in place and in use, parcel B was sold to the Hooks. The
Hooks used the water from the spring for nineteen and one half years
until the Kirbys capped the pipeline. The Hooks filed suit in the circuit court claiming that: 1) as riparian land owners, they possessed a
right to use the water from the spring, and 2) they had a right to use
the water piped from the spring via an easement by prescription. The
Hooks asked the court to decide whether they had any riparian rights
in the spring located on the Kirbys' parcel when no permanent watercourse or stream came from that spring. The Hooks also asked
whether their use of the water was an adverse use for the purposes of
establishing a prescriptive easement, and whether they could tack the
predecessor's time of adverse use to their time so as to satisfy the requirement for a prescriptive easement.
The court held that the Hooks did not have riparian rights to the
spring, but that their use of the water through the pipeline was adverse
for purposes of establishing a prescriptive easement, and that the
Hooks could tack the time of the predecessor's adverse use to their
own time to satisfy the requirement for a prescriptive easement.
The court found that percolating waters formed the spring on the
Kirbys' parcel, and riparian rights do not govern percolating waters.
Therefore, the Hooks had no riparian rights to the spring on the Kirbys' parcel.
The court further found that a prescriptive easement arises when a
party makes an adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted use of another's
real property for twenty years. Also, a party's use is adverse if it occurs
without permission. When the Kirbys gave the previous owners of parcel B the right to use the spring water, they did so orally, intending it
to be a permanent right. However, the statute of frauds states that a
party cannot orally give away a permanent right. When the Kirbys gave
a permanent right orally, the right became void. Because the right
given to the previous owners was void, the Hooks' continued use was
without permission and therefore adverse.
The court further reasoned that a party must show a color of title
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on the previous owners' right in order to tack their time of use to the
present possessor's time. The previous owners erroneously thought
they had a real property right to the water. This produced a color of
title that allowed the Hooks to tack on the previous owners' time of
adverse use.
Joseph A. Dawson

NEBRASKA
Springer v. Kuhns, 571 N.W.2d 323 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
a statute authorizing ground water transfer off overlying lands to adjacent lands for agricultural purposes operates retroactively on existing
agreements).
In 1995, Nebraska passed a statute that authorized ground water
transfers off overlying lands to adjacent lands for agricultural purposes. This case presents the question of whether that statute should
apply retroactively, specifically to an agreement made in 1989.
The Springers owned eighty acres of farm land, and offered to sell
sixty to Kuhns. The Springers wanted to keep the southern most
twenty acres to retain access to a well and underground pipeline with
which they planned to irrigate their adjoining land. Kuhns offered to
provide an easement for access to the well and pipeline if she could
purchase the entire eighty acres. The Springers agreed, and the parties signed a warranty deed. The Springers retained all water rights
and an easement. The easement provided "for access, maintenance
and repair to an irrigation pipeline and related equipment to the existing or replacement well ....

.

After five years, a dispute arose between the parties, and Kuhns refused to honor the reservation of water rights in the deed. The
Springers filed suit in district court, requesting either recission of the
deed, or "reformation of the deed and an order quieting title in them
to the retention of the water rights." The court issued a temporary injunction and, equating such reservation of water rights to that of mineral rights, issued quiet title in the Springers to the water and the
easement, and enjoined Kuhns from preventing the Springers' use of
the well. Kuhns alleged the district court erred in finding that the
agreement severed water rights from ownership of the overlying land.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding, but on
different grounds. To reach its decision, the court examined the history of Nebraska ground water law and the legislature's intent in passing the 1995 statute. Prior to 1957, Nebraska water law prohibited
transfer of ground water from overlying land. Beginning in 1957, the
Nebraska legislature passed various laws that allowed for exceptions to
the general rule.

